AMNEYAH MOHAMMED AL-SILK / امنية محمد السلك


Memorializing Palestinian Terrorists


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Amneyah Mohammed al-Silk was killed on July 30, 2014 by an Israeli airstrike in Shuja’iyya, Gaza. She was killed two other relatives Layan Nael al-Silk and Malak Jalal al-Silk.

Source: English Al-Akhbar


  1. YASMINA September 16, 2014 at 11:04 am REPLYBeautiful baby girl, mashaAllah! May the highest level of Jannah be your playground! Innocent child.Like
  2. JANE ROSSITER-SMITH September 17, 2014 at 4:30 am REPLYAmneyah, your young life was taken away from you so brutally, all your hopes and dreams. The world was robbed of your beautiful smile and all you gave to it.
    Sincere condolences to your family and friends.
  3. RABIAH September 17, 2014 at 5:03 pm REPLYI’m v sad, no words can bring u back. May Allah give ur family courage to go through such a hard time if they r still alive. My heart breaks for u and many many beautiful others who never given a chance to stay alive and being slaughtered by israHel terrorists. Ur smile making me cry little girl x






Umniyah Muhammad ‘Abd al-Karim a-Silk
… killed on 30 Jul 2014 in Gaza City … Killed on the rooftop of her family’s home with her two brothers … grandfather and five other members of her family … killed in a strike on their home, which is near the marketplace in the neighborhood of a-Shuja’iyeh, Gaza City. In a strike on the marketplace shortly after, another 20 people were killed….


The Military Advocate General (MAG Corps’) (Hebrew: הפרקליטות הצבאית‎, HaParklitut HaTzva’it) is responsible for implementing the rule of law within the Israel Defense Forces. The unit’s objectives include integrating the rule of law amongst IDF commanders and soldiers;⁸ providing commanders with the tools for the effective performance of their missions in accordance with the law; and working with the IDF achieve its goals on all legal fronts. The MAG Corps’, most noteworthly, has the ability to provide legal advice in emergencies and during warfare.[1]

For more about the MAG Corps, click HERE (Use Back Arrow to Return)


A General Staff Mechanism for Fact-Finding Assessments (the ‘FFA Mechanism’) examines Exceptional Incidents that occurred during Operation ‘Protective Edge’. The FFA Mechanism, headed by a Major General, was activated soon after the commencement of Operation ‘Protective Edge’, in the midst of the ongoing hostilities.

To read more about the FFA Mechanism, click HERE (Use Back Arrow to Return)


In reports published in various media sources, it was alleged that on 30 July 2014, IDF forces fired upon the marketplace in Shuja’iyya, at a time when a ceasefire was in place, and as a result of these strikes, between 15 to 17 people were killed, including children, emergency services personnel, and reporters. Subsequently, and in accordance with the MAG’s investigation policy, the incident was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

After the incident was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination, the MAG Corps received an additional complaint from an NGO, in which a different account of the event was provided. According to the account provided in the complaint, the incident described above actually took place in an area that was at a distance of around 150 meters from the market in Shuja’iyya, and not within the market itself. According to the allegations, the event commenced with a strike by a shell on a number of individuals from the Al-Salak family, who were up on the roof of their house, a fact which resulted in the death of seven members of the family. After the strike, a large number of people started to gather in the open area next to the family’s house, including medical personnel, reporters, and others. While people were gathered there, another two shells struck the area, resulting in the deaths of 21 of those present. Additionally, it was alleged that as a result of additional shell strikes, an individual in an adjacent building was killed, along with two individuals part of Hamas’ Civil Defence. All total, according to this account, 31 people were killed in the course of this incident. It was further alleged, that over the course of the incident, a total of 16 shells were fired at the area.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and presented to the MAG, the events associated with the incident started at approximately 16:10, when an anti-tank (AT) missile was fired at IDF forces operating in an open area on the outskirts of the Shuja’iyya neighborhood. Immediately after the anti-tank missile was fired, there commenced an intense and ongoing burst of mortar fire, emanating from a built-up area in the neighborhood, targeting the forces. As a result of this fire an IDF soldier was injured and the rest of the soldiers at the scene were placed in real danger. Further, in light of this use of fire, and the situation in which the forces found themselves (including a tank that could not move due to malfunction), the conclusion drawn by the commanders in the field was that this fire could provide cover for an attempt to abduct a soldier. During this episode of mortar fire, five sites in a built-up area were identified as points from which shells had been fired at IDF forces. Nevertheless, IDF forces did not return fire towards the sources of this fire, because of their proximity to “sensitive sites” (in the IDF, “sensitive sites” are civilian sites that receive special protection from attack under the law of armed conflict (such as medical facilities), as well as other civilian sites that warrant special consideration for policy reasons, even when there is no legal obligation (such as schools); such sites are identified in advance by the IDF and integrated into IDF’s operational systems).

At approximately 16:40, when the mortar fire had not yet ceased, IDF forces fired a number of rounds of smoke-screening shells, in order to screen the troops, and frustrate the enemy fire. At approximately 17:00, as the mortar fire upon the troops from the built-up area continued, and in light of the ongoing threat to the lives of the troops, the forces were able to identify two additional sources of fire, from which most of the fire towards them was originating at that time. After it was concluded that one of these points was sufficiently distant from sensitive sites, it was decided to return a limited amount of fire, of five mortar shells, with the aim of suppressing the fire targeted at IDF forces. The IDF fire was carried out using mortars, since there was no available alternative for carrying out the strike, including aerial alternatives, which would allow the necessary operational effect to be achieved. In this context, the possibility of using 155 mm high- explosive artillery shells was also considered, in order to address the danger faced by the forces. This possibility was dismissed for the reason that the collateral damage expected from mortar shells was more limited.

Approximately 18 minutes after the initial mortar fire was carried out by the forces, towards the source of the fire, and after the fire emanating from that site had not ceased, it was decided to fire an additional ten mortars towards it. After this round of fire, the mortar fire on IDF forces ceased. Only around 40 minutes after the execution of the above-mentioned fire were reports received by the IDF regarding the hit on civilians in this area.

The FFA Mechanism’s findings further revealed that at the time of the incident, the forces had believed that the likelihood of civilians being harmed as a result of the fire was low. Before the start of the ground incursion in Shuja’iyya, a widespread warning to evacuate had been provided, which, according to the information in the force’s possession, had resulted in the evacuation of the vast majority of the civilian population in the neighborhood. An additional warning to evacuate was made two days prior to the incident, on 28 July, in order to keep the civilian population at a distance from the area of hostilities. Moreover, during the ongoing aerial surveillance carried out in the area in the period leading up to the incident, no civilian presence was identified on the roads and in the open areas of the neighborhood – which are the areas in which the danger posed by mortar shells is generally greater than the danger to those inside a building. In real time, no aerial surveillance capabilities were available to the forces. Thus, even if the possibility of civilian presence in the area had not been entirely ruled out, in consideration of the assessment that most of the population had evacuated and that no civilian presence was identified in the area prior to the incident, the understanding was that the risk of harm as a result of the limited fire was low.

After the event, by comparing the actions taken by IDF forces with the allegations contained in the complaint received by the MAG Corps, it can be concluded that one of the shells from the first round of fire carried out by IDF forces apparently struck the roof of the Al-Salak family, at a time when the family was on the roof, and killed seven family members; and that two shells from the second round of fire carried out by IDF forces apparently struck the crowd which had gathered next to the Al-Salak house in the wake of the first strike. At the same time, the possibility that the harm to civilians during this incident resulted from a misfire by a Palestinian terror organization has not been ruled out, in light of the extensive enemy mortar fire emanating from the area at the time.

In addition to the above, intelligence information indicated that six of the deceased in this incident appear to have been militants, and thus the total civilian fatalities is lower than that alleged in the complaint.

The FFA Mechanism’s findings further concluded, that the incident in question did not take place during a ceasefire in Shuja’iyya. The IDF announced a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire between the hours of 15:00 and 19:00 on that day, but clarified that this would not apply in a number of specific areas in which IDF forces were operating at that time, including Shuja’iyya (along with a number of other areas). This was transmitted in the media and in messages that were passed to the Palestinian side.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA Mechanism, the MAG found that the fire was carried out in a manner that accorded with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The fire was aimed towards mortars and their operators, with the aim of neutralizing their capacity to continue carrying out ongoing and intensive fire on IDF forces, who found themselves in a situation of clear and present mortal danger. Prior to the execution of the fire, and during it, IDF forces acted in a restrained and calculated manner, and undertook a number of precautions which were intended to avoid, and in any event to minimize, harm to civilians. Initially the forces refrained entirely from returning fire, and thereafter they attempted to frustrate and cause the cessation of this fire by creating a smoke screen. After the fire did not cease, a number of alternatives were considered for returning fire to the sources of the fire, and out of the available and effective alternatives, they chose the means that was expected to result in the least collateral damage. Even then, the return fire was carried out in a measured and limited fashion.

As regards the strike’s compliance with the principle of proportionality, the MAG considered the reasonableness of the commander’s decision, taking into account the information that he had at his disposal at that time, both as regards the imperative military necessity of stopping the fire and neutralizing the danger posed to the forces, as well as in regard to the harm expected to result to civilians as a result of the strike. The MAG found, that in the incident in question, there occurred a number of coincidences and series of events that a military commander should not be expected to predict – the shell that resulted in the first instance of extensive harm to civilians (members of the Al-Salak family) landed on a roof, at a time where there was a group of people on the roof (while the chance that the shell would penetrate the building and cause similar harm to persons inside, was lower); and the second instance of extensive harm was caused to a group who had gathered outside the house of the Al-Salak family, in the wake of the previous strike. At the time when the decision was made to carry out the second round of fire, IDF forces were not aware of the hit on the Al-Salak house as a result of the first round of fire, nor of the crowd which had gathered outside the Al-Salak house. In light of the above, the MAG found that the commander’s assessment that the collateral damage expected from the strike would not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from it, was not unreasonable under the circumstances, in light of the information that was at his disposal at that time. As such the MAG found that there had been no misconduct on the part of IDF forces in regards to the incident in question, and that even though the ultimate outcome of the action was tragic, it does not affect the legality of the fire post facto.

In light of these findings, the MAG did not find that the actions of IDF forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. As a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without opening a criminal investigation or ordering further action against those involved in the incident.


During the 2014 Gaza war, an anti-tank missile was fired at IDF forces operating in an area on the outskirts of the Shuja’iyya neighborhood. After this, an intense and ongoing burst of mortar fire was directed at IDF troops from the Shuja’iyya neighborhood.

Because the source of the mortar fire was coming from civilian sites, the IDF fired rounds of smoke-screening shells to protect their troops and frustrate the enemy. When the mortar fire continued, the IDF identified a source of fire that was sufficiently distant from civilian sites.
It was decided to target the site and suppress the fire targeting IDF forces by using mortars.

After the initial mortar fire was carried out by IDF forces towards the source of the fire, and after the fire emanating from that site had not ceased, it was decided to fire an additional ten mortar rounds towards it. After this round of fire, the mortar fire on IDF forces ceased. Forty minutes later reports were received by the IDF regarding the hit on civilians in the area.

It was concluded by the MAG Corps, that one mortar round from the first round of firing apparently hit the roof of the Al-Salak [Silk] family house when the family was on the roof.

The IDF mortar fire was aimed at enemy mortars and their operators with the goal of neutralizing their capacity to continue carrying out ongoing and intensive fire on IDF forces who found themselves in a situation of clear and present danger.



“Amneyah Mohammed al-Silk was killed on July 30, 2014 by an Israeli airstrike in Shuja’iyya, Gaza.”


Amneyah Mohammed al-Silk (Salak) was NOT killed by an Israeli airstrike. She and her family members were killed by a single mortar round that was aimed at terrorist combatants who were engaged in battle with IDF troops.